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Turning Reconciliation on Its Head:
Responding to Sexual Violence
Under the Khmer Rouge
Katrina Anderson1
I wonder how both sides can reconcile if one side is the victim and
the other is the perpetrator. And the perpetrators have not accepted
their mistakes. If they admit their actions, it would be up to me to
forgive them or not. It depends on how they confess. I almost
died, but they have only compensated my loss with the word
“sorry”. . . .
Tang Kim, Khmer Rouge rape survivor2
Tang Kim turned twenty-three years old in 1976, shortly after the Khmer
Rouge defeated the American-backed Lon Nol government and unleashed a
reign of terror on the countryside of Cambodia. One night, a group of
soldiers seized Tang Kim and brutally raped her in a field near her village.
She hid for three days in a leech-infested swamp and witnessed thirty-three
families murdered. Of eight women who fled the village, she was the only
one to escape alive.
In a recent film produced by the Documentation Center of Cambodia
(DC-Cam),3 Tang Kim breaks her silence for the first time in twenty-eight
years. The importance of this film cannot be understated, for she is the first
Cambodian woman to speak publicly about the crimes of rape that occurred
during the five-year period of Democratic Kampuchea (DK) under the rule
of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), commonly known as the
Khmer Rouge.4 Between 1975 and 1979, millions of Cambodians either
starved to death or were killed, and countless more were tortured or were
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deprived of food. No one has ever been held accountable for these crimes,
nor has any serious attempt at national reconciliation ever been made.
Thirty years after the fall of the DK regime, the Cambodian government
finally agreed to bring some members of the CPK leadership to trial for
domestic and international crimes committed during their reign of terror. In
October 2004, the Cambodian National Assembly approved a long-debated
piece of legislation that created a special tribunal within Cambodia’s court
system, called the Extraordinary Chambers (EC), for the purpose of trying
senior leaders of the DK regime.5 With trials expected to begin sometime in
2005,6 it is widely hoped that the EC will open the door to reconciliation by
creating a historical record that documents how the Khmer Rouge came to
power and why the regime caused such massive social disruption.
While the tribunal may succeed in holding accountable some of the most
responsible actors for the Khmer Rouge crimes, the EC alone is an
insufficient mechanism for national reconciliation. The purpose of this
article is to challenge the singular approach to reconciliation through the use
of judicial mechanisms that are blind to and ineffective with respect to
certain crimes, and instead to promote creative approaches focused on
grassroots social repair. The tribunal reflects a “top-down” approach to
accountability that has dominated transitional justice discourses since the
Nuremberg trials. This theory presumes that the responsibility for the
crimes rests in the upper echelons of CPK leadership, not among the lowerlevel officers.7 Hence, any historical record generated by the EC will omit
culpability on the part of lower-level officers, depriving Cambodians of the
opportunity to confront this class of perpetrators and learn about their role
in the regime. The driving theory behind the EC therefore subverts a key
purpose of creating a tribunal—to create a factual, unbiased, historical
record of what happened and why.8 Individual accountability for the top
Khmer Rouge leaders is not likely to make a significant difference in the
lives of victims of rape and sexual abuse who live in close proximity to
their rapists and who struggle daily with the legacy of those horrible crimes
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that remain unacknowledged by the rest of Cambodian society. For this
reason, a clear majority of Cambodians recognize that other mechanisms
will be necessary to repair Cambodia’s torn social fabric, even though a
similar proportion of the population believes the tribunal provides a critical
opening for a national dialogue about the past.9 Supplemental mechanisms
are necessary to address crimes committed by lower-level officers; this is
particularly true of sexual violence against women committed under the DK
regime. Accountability and reconciliation strategies designed from the
bottom-up, rather than the top-down, will more accurately meet the goals of
average Cambodians to face the past and to chart the future of their country.
Part I of this article describes the sexual crimes committed under the DK
regime and offers a hypothesis to explain why these crimes have been
omitted from the historical narrative of Khmer Rouge atrocities. The
silence surrounding crimes against women has affected the drafting of the
EC Statute and has limited the possibility of holding the perpetrators
accountable for rape.
Part II of this article analyzes the limited capacity of the EC to address
crimes of sexual violence and predicts that such crimes will not figure
prominently in the prosecutions for four principal reasons. First, as
mentioned above, the EC’s narrow mandate precludes the possibility of
prosecuting those who actually perpetrated the sexual crimes—the lowerlevel cadre. Second, gaps in the EC Statute, such as the omission of rape as
a domestic crime and the use of outdated terminology, would make the EC
prosecutor’s task extremely difficult if such prosecutions were undertaken.
Third, the EC cannot possibly be immune from the hostility towards
prosecutions on the basis of sexual violence that exists in Cambodia’s legal
system. Finally, the collection of evidence—always difficult in the case of
sexual crimes—will be particularly challenging for the EC prosecutors
given the passage of time between the commission of the crimes and the
establishment of the tribunal, compounded by the emotional and
psychological impact of testifying for victims.
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The combination of these four factors virtually guarantee that
prosecutions for rape at the EC will be rare and inadequate; nevertheless,
observers of the tribunal must pressure the EC to investigate and to
prosecute sexual crimes. Part III of the article offers four recommendations
to insure that prosecutions for rape are pursued in a way that will empower
women victims and witnesses.
These include institutional
recommendations for the EC, as well as procedural protections that proved
successful at the two fully international tribunals, the International Criminal
Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR).
Cambodia’s choice to embrace a model of retributive justice through the
EC does not necessarily preclude the use of restorative justice mechanisms
in Cambodia. Part IV acknowledges that given both the importance of
uncovering the truth about crimes of sexual violence and the unlikelihood of
successfully prosecuting sexual crimes, supplemental means of addressing
these crimes should be explored. For instance, traditional Cambodian or
Buddhist methods of dispute resolution may provide a window for victims
and perpetrators to confront each other and to move towards forgiveness
and reconciliation. Part IV analyzes some possibilities for local justice
initiatives in Cambodia that could be used to confront the buried history of
sexual violence. This section also draws on the lessons learned from local
justice models in other post-conflict situations in an attempt to predict
similar obstacles and to correct them before they occur.
There is no doubt that confronting the buried history of sexual crimes in
Cambodia will take a serious commitment of time and resources: first to
create an accurate historical record, next to hold actors accountable, and
finally to promote long-term reconciliation. This article recognizes that
silence can no longer be the appropriate response. Across Cambodia,
women like Tang Kim are waiting to tell their stories.
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I. SEXUAL CRIMES UNDER THE KHMER ROUGE
When the DK regime fell in 1979, the international community entered
Cambodia for the first time in five years and discovered graphic physical
evidence of killing and torture on an absolutely staggering scale. At least
1.5 million people—20 percent of the Cambodian population—died during
the four-year Khmer Rouge regime.10 Of these, between 500,000 and one
million people were executed, while others died of starvation and disease.
The vast physical evidence in mass graves (such as those at Choeung Ek
only fourteen kilometers from Phnom Penh) and the torture devices left at
Tuol Sleng (an elementary school converted into several torture chambers)
offered powerful evidence of the Khmer Rouge regime’s methodological
acts of torture and extrajudicial killing.
At first, the scale of the destruction blurred distinctions between the
victims. While the vast majority of the victims were ethnic Khmers, they
also included Cambodians of Vietnamese decent and Muslim Chams. Not
even Buddhist monks and nuns were spared. In the Khmer Rouge’s quest
to purge “enemy elements” from every sector of society, they killed men,
women, the elderly, and children. No sector of Cambodian society was
immune from persecution.11
The forensic evidence alone did not indicate that women had suffered
differently than men. Skeletal remains do not reveal evidence of rape or
sexual assault, and the dead took their stories with them. During the
documentation of the Khmer Rouge crimes, women survivors remained
silent on the subject of rape. Thus, it was assumed that rape had not been
used as a weapon of war in the way it had under other genocidal regimes,
such as in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
Also, in contrast to other regimes, the Khmer Rouge was widely known
to have espoused a policy strictly forbidding rape and even went so far as to
outlaw sexual relations of any kind outside of marriage. The regime viewed
sex as subversive behavior that would distract people from what ought to
have been the focus of their work, the agrarian revolution. Although the
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regime wanted to project an image of the revolutionary organization, or
Angkar,12 as morally pure, the policy was less rooted in morality than it was
in the Maoist philosophy that valorized efficiency above all else.13 Morality
provided a convenient excuse for controlling all aspects of civilian life.
The strict prohibition on sex protected some women from sexual violence
because men considered the risk of transgression too high. But as
researcher Kalyanne Mam concluded after conducting the most extensive
set of interviews of women survivors to date, the Khmer Rouge policy had
the perverse effect of encouraging sexual crimes against many women.14 In
effect, the Khmer Rouge policy “drove the practices underground.”15 In
order to conceal evidence, soldiers killed women immediately after raping
them. In the film about her life, Tang Kim also describes this practice:
They raped all of those who were sent to be killed. They would
never rape a woman otherwise….You [the filmmaker] have said
that you were looking for people who committed moral offenses
with Khmer Rouge soldiers, but you could not find such a case.
The Khmer Rouge would never do anything like that; both the
rapist and the victim would be executed if it was found out. So,
they would only rape those who were condemned to die.16
Moreover, as Tang Kim indicates, the laws punished both the perpetrator
and the victim of sexual violence for committing a sin against the Angkar.
Women were too afraid to report sexual abuse; they were told that if they
informed the Angkar of the crime, they would be killed.17 Like Tang Kim,
who went to live in a cooperative after surviving her rape but refused to
show her face to anyone, women went to great lengths to avoid the attention
of the Angkar. A culture of blame directed at the survivors of rape persists
in Cambodia, preventing survivors from coming forward with their stories.
Women in rural Cambodia are particularly fearful because they may live
close to their perpetrators and would risk disrupting key social networks by
naming them.
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The perpetrators were not only protected by laws that deterred reporting,
but also by the decentralized structure of the Khmer Rouge command. This
structure kept senior commanders from discovering the crimes of
subordinate soldiers.18 One victim reported that at one prison, women
prisoners would be raped until they became pregnant, then they were killed
to conceal the evidence.19 The guards’ crimes were never discovered
because the prison was physically isolated and the guards controlled who
entered and who left.20 Not surprisingly, the Khmer Rouge policy did not
deter rape from occurring but instead created a culture of impunity around
the act of rape. If perpetrators could conceal all evidence by killing their
victims, they could uphold the illusion of a moral society wholly devoted to
serving the Angkar.
Most Cambodians—including women who survived the Khmer Rouge
regime—believed that rape did not occur during that time because of the
lack of preserved physical evidence of rape, the regime’s severe regulation
of sexuality and its unanticipated effects, and the forced silence of women
victims. Systematic rape apparently did not occur on the massive scale
witnessed in certain other genocidal regimes such as Rwanda and
Yugoslavia, but rape and sexual abuse certainly did take place under the
Khmer Rouge. The present challenge for Cambodians is how to address
these buried crimes. Most of the physical and testimonial evidence has
vanished with the death of the victims. It is imperative to create a
mechanism for addressing these crimes—one that will allow Cambodians to
face a buried past, shatter the myth that rape did not occur under the Khmer
Rouge, and move towards genuine community reconciliation.

II. RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS
The EC Statute is the result of a protracted and highly political
negotiation process between the United Nations (UN) and the Cambodian
government.21 In 1997, the Cambodian government invited the UN to assist
the country in establishing a Khmer Rouge tribunal.22 The UN Secretary
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General soon after appointed an international and independent Group of
Experts, which marked the first international response to the Khmer Rouge
crimes since 1978. The Group’s mandate was to evaluate the existing
evidence and nature of the crimes committed, to determine the feasibility of
bringing perpetrators to justice, and to evaluate the options for trials before
international or domestic courts. In February 1999, the Group of Experts
issued its final report calling for the creation of a fully international tribunal
similar to the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) or the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).23 The Cambodian
government rejected this recommendation, preferring a fully Cambodian
court to preserve its sovereignty.24 Eventually, a compromise was reached
to create a “mixed” tribunal composed of a one-seat majority of Cambodian
judges who would primarily apply Cambodian law.25 In December 2004,
the UN and the Cambodian government agreed on a budget to fund the
tribunal and initiated the UN’s process of raising funds among donor
nations.26 Assuming fundraising efforts are successful, the EC is projected
to begin trials sometime in 2005.
Among observers within and outside Cambodia, significant doubts
remain as to whether fair trials are possible with the EC operating as a
special court within the Cambodian court system, rather than as a separate
international tribunal.27 Nevertheless, the EC is the most promising
accountability mechanism proposed to date, and time and opportunity yet
remains to fix its flaws. This section discusses the primary obstacles to
prosecuting crimes of sexual violence in hopes they can be addressed before
the commencement of the EC.
A. Limited Personal Jurisdiction
One of the more controversial aspects of the tribunal is its prosecutorial
scope. The UN Group of Experts recommended that the tribunal have a
mandate to prosecute “those persons most responsible” for the serious
crimes committed during the DK regime, including “senior leaders” as well
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as “those at lower levels who are directly implicated in the most serious
atrocities.”28 The language in the final EC Statute narrows the scope of
jurisdiction to those “senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those
who were most responsible for the crimes.”29
The language of the EC Statute precludes the possibility of holding
accountable a broad range of lower-level commanders who might bear a
significant portion of responsibility for the crimes committed.30 It was
intended to exclude current political leaders, most notably Prime Minister
Hun Sen, who held minor positions in the CPK. The EC Statute presumes a
theory of why the crimes were committed: the top CPK leadership
conspired to commit genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes on
a mass scale by developing the machinery to carry them out.31 Historian
Steven Heder argues that the EC’s lack of jurisdiction over the “small fish”
prevents prosecutors from exploring an equally plausible alternative theory
of why the crimes occurred—that the crimes resulted from an abuse of
authority in which subordinate soldiers acted on their own volition without
the knowledge of the senior leaders.32
Cambodians have stated that they want a tribunal in order to understand
what went wrong under the Khmer Rouge so as to prevent such events from
ever happening again. Sixty-five percent of Cambodians perceive the
lower-level Khmer Rouge cadre as the perpetrators,33 but the public is
clearly split on how to hold them accountable. Forty-one percent consider
the lower-level soldiers to be both victims and perpetrators; however, a
majority does not pity them,34 and 67 percent stated that they could not
forgive the soldiers who actually perpetrated the crimes against them.35
Historical accounts show that lower-level cadre were often persecuted by
CPK party leaders, but the experiences of these soldiers were too diverse to
lump them all into either the “victim” or “perpetrator” category.36 By
shifting the focus away from the experiences of the foot soldiers toward
those of the senior leaders, the EC’s restricted mandate will likely not lead
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us any closer to understanding how CPK policies developed, and how these
policies were upheld, changed, or rejected on the ground.
The restricted mandate also has serious implications for prosecutions of
sexual violence. Prosecutors would face an enormous challenge in proving
that the senior leaders ordered the lower-level soldiers’ acts of sexual
violence. Senior leaders were unlikely to commit rape themselves due to
the Khmer Rouge policy forbidding it, so a prosecutor would have to show
that the defendant held command responsibility over the lower-level cadre
who actually committed the rape.
The theory of command responsibility allows a senior leader to be held
accountable for the actions of a subordinate if the defendant knew, or
should have known, that his subordinates were committing abuses, and the
leader either failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent
those abuses or failed to punish the perpetrators.37 This doctrine reflects the
belief that commanders are more culpable than subordinates because they
either ordered the crimes or failed to supervise and punish those who
committed them. Senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge maintain that they did
not order sexual crimes, and the well-known policy prohibiting rape
supports their claim. But even if a senior leader did not order the rape, a
prosecutor may still be able to prove command responsibility if there is
evidence that the commander was negligent in preventing the rape.38
Evidence indicates, however, that in areas where rape occurred, most senior
leaders did not know about the crimes of their subordinate officers. More
often, lower-level Khmer Rouge soldiers committed rape in secret and
concealed all evidence of the crime. As Kalyanee Mam explained,
[I]t was imperative that all evidence of the crime was completely
destroyed and higher officials did not find out about the rape that
had taken place. It was not enough to simply threaten their victims
not to speak against them. Victims had to be killed in order to
remove all traces of the crime.39
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Testimonies from survivors indicate that senior leaders also did not have
effective control of their subordinates’ actions, at least in certain locations.
Researchers at the Documentation Center of Cambodia have gathered
evidence suggesting that rape was widespread and systematic against
members of ethnic minority groups in Cambodia, including the Vietnamese,
Cham, and Chinese, especially when imprisoned.40 Reports vary as to the
extent of sexual violence in prisons, where women comprised 6.4 percent of
the population.41 In his authoritative book on the infamous “S-21” prison in
Phnom Penh, David Chandler states that sexual assault was infrequent in
the prison due to close monitoring by prison guards.42 Female guards were
even called to witness the interrogation of female prisoners in order to
prevent torture of a sexual nature.43
In contrast, one of Mam’s interviewees told her how soldiers repeatedly
raped all of the young female prisoners at a provincial prison called “Munti
#15.” The former prisoner explained, “[t]hose people probably tried to
prevent the top leaders from finding out, because [at Munti #15] there were
[ten] soldiers that guarded us, so it was easy for them to conceal what they
were doing. There was no one coming in or out.”44 Chandler’s and Mam’s
reports are actually consistent, for they suggest that rape was more likely to
occur when soldiers were least likely to be monitored. Guards in a prison
such as Tuol Sleng, where senior leaders passed through regularly or had
frequent communication with the prison officials, were punished severely
for the slightest infraction. But in jungle camps where prisoners were
isolated from the scrutiny of Khmer Rouge leadership, soldiers acted as
they pleased.
A successful prosecution for rape depends on prosecutors’ ability to show
that senior leaders either ordered or knew of and failed to prevent or punish
rape, and that they held effective control over their subordinates in those
areas where the majority of the rapes seem to have occurred. The available
evidence about how rape was perpetrated under the Khmer Rouge supports
the opposite conclusion, that the majority of crimes resulted from an abuse
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of authority by subordinates rather than a top-down conspiracy devised by
Khmer Rouge commanders to use rape as a weapon of war. The fact that
sexual crimes were driven underground—causing extreme secrecy and
destruction of physical evidence—makes it nearly impossible to prove that
senior leaders promulgated a policy to use rape “with the intent to
destroy”45 a civilian population, or “as part of a widespread or systematic
attack”46 against a civilian population. While it makes sense from a moral
perspective to pursue the “big fish” and hold them accountable before the
EC, a major consequence of this approach will be a lack of accountability
for many serious crimes, including rape, and the absence of these crimes on
the historical record.
B. Omission of Rape as a Domestic Crime
The EC Statute includes three domestic crimes (murder, torture, and
religious persecution)47 and five international crimes (genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, crimes against cultural property, and crimes
against internationally protected persons).48 Rape was not included as a
domestic crime under the EC Statute even though Cambodia’s 1956 Penal
Code—the criminal code in force at the time of the DK regime—lists rape
as a crime.49 There are many possible explanations for the omission. It
could be attributed to the widespread belief that rape did not occur during
the DK era because it was forbidden by the official CPK policy. As
discussed in Part I, physical evidence of rape did not exist. Rape and sexual
abuse were also underreported by women, who remained silent out of
shame or fear. Furthermore, during the time the EC Statute was being
negotiated, scant research had been undertaken on the subject of sexual
crimes against women under the Khmer Rouge. Consequently, the
international outrage against rape and sexual violence committed by the
genocidal regimes in Rwanda and Yugoslavia—outrage that facilitated the
aggressive prosecution of these crimes at the ICTR and ICTY—did not
exist in Cambodia.50
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Despite the lack of physical evidence, the fact that further inquiries of
rape and sexual assault of Cambodian women were not conducted with the
aim to include sexual crimes in the EC Statute is still disappointing. By the
time of the EC’s ratification in October 2004, researchers had gathered
enough testimony from women survivors to allow for the possibility that
rape had occurred. The lessons of other investigations of mass atrocities
had also begun to focus on crimes against women. In recent years, the
ICTR and ICTY have declared rape a war crime,51 a crime against
humanity,52 an act of genocide,53 and torture,54 and thereby greatly
contributed to the international jurisprudence on gender-related crimes.55
The EC Statute’s omission of rape as a specific domestic crime is especially
troubling given the great strides that these tribunals’ judgments have made
towards recognizing the historical use of rape as a weapon of war.
C. Use of Outdated and Restrictive Terminology
Prosecutors will still have the option of charging rape as an international
crime. Although the Geneva Conventions do not specifically list rape as a
war crime, rape is now considered a grave breach under the Fourth Geneva
Convention, which prohibits “willfully causing great suffering or serious
injury to body or health” and “inhuman treatment” of civilians.56
Furthermore, ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence have helped move international
law towards acceptance of rape as a war crime.
Unfortunately, the drafters of the EC Statute chose to incorporate
outdated terminology from international humanitarian law instead of the
more inclusive and more current statutory language from the two main
international tribunals. Article 6 of the EC Statute does not list rape or
sexual violence as a war crime. The drafters rejected a more expansive
definition of war crimes based on the “grave breaches” provision of the
Fourth Geneva Convention or the ICTR Statute, which include “rape,
enforced prostitution, and any form of indecent assault.”57
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On the other hand, the language in Article 6 does not limit the acts
chargeable as war crimes to the acts listed therein, as evidenced by the
phrase “such as the following acts.” Naming rape as the constituent act of a
war crime would be preferable to charging defendants with one of the other
acts that are explicitly named in Article 6, such as “torture,” “inhumane
treatment,” “great suffering,” or “serious injury to body or health.” A
charge on one of these bases denies the sexual and gender-based aspects of
rape and its distinct physical and psychological harms that deserve
particularized remedies. Furthermore, as Kelly Askin points out, the
vagueness of the charge is also “wholly useless as a deterrent.”58
Considering the attitudes of Cambodia’s legal system towards rape, it is
optimistic to assume that rape will be separately prosecuted as a war crime
without significant pressure from the international community.
Although the drafters did list rape as one of the constituent acts of crimes
against humanity in Article 5, this Article notably omits other types of
sexual crimes, such as abuse or enslavement, that survivors claim also took
place under the DK regime. Due to differences in the language between the
EC Statute and the ICTR and ICTY Statutes, it is unclear whether the EC
will find the ICTR and ICTY jurisprudence authoritative in interpreting the
definition of crimes against humanity based on rape.
The jurisprudence of the ICTR and the ICTY has significantly developed
the definition of rape and sexual assault under international law. For
example, the ICTR broadly defined “sexual violence,” which includes rape,
“as a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under
circumstances which are coercive.”59 The tribunal then defined coercive
circumstances expansively as those that include “threats, intimidation,
extortion, and other forms of duress,” such as the existence of armed
conflict or the presence of armed militants.60 Subsequent decisions have
also expanded the definition of sexual crimes that qualify as crimes against
humanity to include sexual assault.61 The ICTR’s precise definition of rape
as a sexual act of force plus coercion is important because it recognizes the
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inherently coercive aspect of armed conflict. The international judges in the
EC will likely push for the application of the ICTR and ICTY’s rich
jurisprudence on sexual violence, but it might be too optimistic to assume
that the Cambodian judges will draw on these progressive definitions.
D. Hostility of the Cambodian Justice System Towards Crimes of Sexual
Violence
The failure of the EC Statute to include rape as a domestic crime, and the
use of outdated legal terminology to describe rape, may be explained in part
by the general treatment of rape under Cambodian domestic law. Even if
the legal inadequacies and evidentiary problems discussed in subsections A
through C above are adequately resolved, any prosecution for rape at the EC
would still encounter a legal culture that is extremely hostile to such
prosecutions. The Cambodian legal system’s failure to deter rape is evident
from three sources of information: the underreporting of rape, the low rate
of rape prosecutions, and the even lower rate of rape convictions.62 Human
rights organizations report that even while incidents of rape dramatically
increase every year, barriers in the judicial system remain that deter many
women from coming forward. These barriers occur at every level of the
process, from investigation to trial, and are firmly entrenched in
Cambodia’s legal system and culture.
Several reasons contribute to the failure of the system to prosecute rape.
First, corruption within the legal system has led citizens to distrust the
promise of due process at trial. Law enforcement officers frequently break
Cambodian law to broker settlements between the parties, including forcing
the victim to accept monetary compensation or even a forced marriage to
the perpetrator.63 Though Cambodian law requires the state to shoulder the
costs of prosecution, victims must pay bribes to initiate investigations and
pay for their medical certificates (the one critical piece of evidence in a rape
case).64 The cumulative cost of bribes necessary just to bring a case to court
makes the cost of prosecuting a rape case prohibitive for most victims.
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Second, the intense social stigmatization of rape victims in Cambodia
discourages women from reporting rape for fear of bringing unbearable
shame upon themselves and their families. A sense of deep shame
frequently accompanies a victim’s fears for her physical safety; for
example, a woman may refuse to tell her story because it would lead to both
acts of revenge by her perpetrator and recrimination and alienation by her
community.65 The president of Licadho, a major Cambodian human rights
organization, explained that most people in Cambodia believe rape is not a
crime because of a popular myth that men cannot control themselves.66
Court officials, however, are not immune to such views, thus creating the
third problem—misinterpretation of the law.
Judges have been known to acquit rape cases based on erroneous
grounds, such as when the victim is not a virgin or when the perpetrator is
related to the victim.67 Though Cambodia’s rape laws are far from ideal—
for example, the law fails to define consent or capacity for determining it—
it is the judges’ unwillingness to suspend personal beliefs and to apply the
correct law that more often harms women. One human rights organization
that monitors rape reported that in 2004, judges sentenced suspects in only 7
percent of cases.68
Finally, Cambodia’s citizenry has a profound distrust of the legal system.
Perpetrators know that they can influence the outcome of a case by bribing
a judge or the appropriate court official, and the public reacts to this sense
of impunity by failing to report crimes or to file complaints. This is
particularly true where the perpetrator is a state actor. Out of twenty-five
cases brought to trial against a state actor in 2003, none resulted in a
conviction.69
E. Collection of Evidence
Gathering evidence to prove crimes against women, particularly sexual
crimes, has historically been very challenging due to a variety of social and
practical factors. The passage of time between the commission of the crime

GENDER AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

Turning Reconciliation on Its Head

and the trial is the most obvious practical obstacle to collecting evidence for
rape cases. This is especially true in the Cambodian context. After thirty
years, any physical evidence of sexual crimes that may have existed has
deteriorated to the point of uselessness, and testimonial evidence is
inevitably lost due to the death of victims and the fading of witness memory
over time.
The emotional torment and psychological impact of rape, which often
endure long after the physical effects have passed, create enormous barriers
for investigators. Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is common in rape
victims and causes them to experience impaired memory, especially during
times that they are forced to recall the triggering events. Eighty percent of
rape survivors in Rwanda were identified as “severely traumatized” after the
conflict ended.70 Investigators in the former Yugoslavia found that repeated
questioning re-traumatized rape victims, and some who retold their stories
multiple times suffered such severe depression that they attempted or
committed suicide.71 Past experience shows that the passage of time buries
the trauma but does not in itself help women recover; for example, some
Japanese “comfort women” did not reveal their stories for decades after
World War II.72 Similarly, twenty-eight years passed before Tang Kim
could talk about her rape. In both cases, the wounds caused by sexual
violence had not yet begun to heal until the victims could talk about their
experiences.
Another obstacle hindering the collection of evidence is the reluctance of
women to report rape because of social consequences such as ridicule,
humiliation, rejection, or ostracism.73 This occurs more frequently in
traditional and patriarchal societies where a woman’s worth is directly
proportional to her chastity and virginity.74 In societies where a sexual
crime against a woman is a crime against her family and community,
families often ostracize the victim to save face.75 Investigators who
interviewed women in post-conflict Guatemala found that few women
talked about their experience of rape because they had deeply internalized it
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as one of many anticipated consequences of the military’s campaign to
destroy indigenous communities.76 Victims denied even to themselves that
they had been raped and described only their general sadness about the
impacts of war. Moreover, untrained investigators lacking the experience
and expertise to ask the relevant questions only buried the crimes deeper.
It should also be noted that investigators and prosecutors can harm
women by overemphasizing sexual crimes, which occurs when researchers
interview with preconceived notions about the violence and fail to listen to
the victims’ narratives. Aryeh Neier explains how researchers in the former
Yugoslavia were reluctant to focus on rape when interviewing women
because, in doing so, they de-contextualized the crime and failed to
represent the extent of women’s harms.77 When rape is accompanied by the
murder of family members, imprisonment, food deprivation, or other gross
human rights violations, it is absorbed into a much longer narrative of
suffering. A narrative disconnect happens when victims of mass atrocity,
who tend to think in terms of an uninterrupted experience of suffering,
explain their story to prosecutors or investigators, who are trained to isolate
facts to support elements of crimes. Separating the crime of rape from other
crimes against women during wartime can cloud a more complete
understanding of all human rights abuses committed against women during
war.78 In Cambodia, rape took place within the context of human rights
abuses against women and ranged from forced separation from family
members to extreme forced labor that led to miscarriages and starvation.79
Prosecutors and investigators that are properly trained to listen to women
victims will learn to appreciate the full range of harms that women have
experienced and give sexual violence the appropriate emphasis.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS
The previous section focused on the obstacles to prosecuting rape at the
EC, but these obstacles are not insurmountable if attention and resources are
devoted to them early in the process. The short- and long-term advantages
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of prosecuting rape cannot be overstated. First and most importantly,
prosecutions could expose the truth about women’s experiences during the
Khmer Rouge and break the silence that threatens to write them out of
history. Second, charging commanders for rape strongly condemns such
behavior and reverses the balance of power between victims and
perpetrators.80 Third, holding perpetrators criminally responsible is one of
the strongest deterrents against the use of rape as a weapon of war in future
conflicts. Fourth, prosecuting rape builds the jurisprudence on rape as an
international crime, educating judges about gender-related crimes and
normatively influencing the way that judges apply the law in rape cases.81
Fifth, prosecutions would help educate Cambodian judges about sexual
violence, which would lead to a better application of Cambodia’s rape laws.
Finally, generating public discussion on issues of sexual violence would
likely challenge popular (sexist) assumptions about rape and prompt
legislative reform to strengthen legal protections for rape victims.
Despite its shortcomings, the EC must be supported as the first step
towards accountability in the long process of reconciliation. Trials before
the EC will begin to formulate a factual record about the events that took
place under the DK regime. The EC’s flaws may prevent many of the real
questions about rape and other crimes from being answered, but it will open
a much-needed national dialogue on the events of the past that will generate
momentum for supplemental forms of reconciliation.
At this point, no one can know whether Tang Kim is a lone rape survivor
of the Khmer Rouge regime or one of thousands who has feared coming
forward for the past thirty years to speak about her rape. Such questions
about the historical record are fair, but they cannot be answered unless the
EC increases both its outreach and access. In its current form, it is safe to
predict that very few women, if any, will testify about rape before the EC.
However, EC officials can implement certain changes at relatively low
practical cost to ensure that victims of sexual violence will be treated with
respect should they decide to testify. These four recommendations include:

VOLUME 3 • ISSUE 2 • 2005

803

804 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

(1) design special procedural protections for witnesses and victims of sexual
violence; (2) create a victims and witnesses unit within the EC to address
short and long-term care for those testifying before the EC; (3) offer gendersensitivity trainings emphasizing issues of sexual violence to EC officials
including judges, prosecutors, and investigators; and (4) appoint women as
judges and prosecutors.
A. Procedural Protections
Unlike the statutes that created the other international and ad hoc
tribunals, the EC Statute does not authorize the EC judges to create their
own rules of procedure and evidence. And at the time of this article, the
Cambodian National Assembly has yet to approve rules of procedure and
evidence for the EC. Consequently, what rules will apply and who will
draft them is impossible to predict. Regardless of how the general rules of
procedure and evidence are established, the EC should follow the example
of other international tribunals and craft special rules to address the needs of
victims of sexual crimes.
Because Cambodian jurisprudence on sexual violence is so
underdeveloped, the tribunal should adopt rules that reflect the valuable
lessons learned from the ICTR and ICTY in dealing with such cases. For
example, the rules of procedure for those tribunals do not require
corroboration of a rape victim’s testimony.82 They also make evidence of
the victim’s prior sexual conduct inadmissible and acknowledge that
consent is not a defense to rape when coercive conditions are present.83
And the ICTR’s Furundzija decision84 marked a significant departure from
harmful assumptions, such as the diminished credibility of victims suffering
from rape trauma disorder, a form of PTSD, who receive counseling. The
court wrote, “Even when a person is suffering from PTSD, this does not
mean that he or she is necessarily inaccurate in the evidence given. There is
no reason why a person with PTSD cannot be a perfectly reliable
witness.”85
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The EC Statute calls for the protection of victims and witnesses but
specifies only one procedure to do so—holding private, in camera,
proceedings for judges to review sensitive evidence.86 Although the EC
Statute does not specify other protective procedures, neither does it limit
them.87 The rules of procedure should specify measures that will provide
for a victim’s security,88 prevent further traumatization,89 and protect a
victim’s privacy.90
B. Victims and Witnesses Unit
To provide comprehensive care, the EC should establish a Victims and
Witnesses Unit that can coordinate the special needs of victims. The EC
Statute currently designates three offices—investigating judges, coprosecutors, and judges—to share the responsibility of caring for the
victims.91 The lack of clearly designated roles reveals that caring for
victims was not a priority for the drafters of the EC Statute, but the EC can
rectify this problem by creating a unit that will provide comprehensive care
and ensure that a victim’s needs do not fall through the bureaucratic cracks.
C. Gender Sensitivity Trainings
Educating officials involved with the EC on gender-sensitive procedures
is critical to addressing crimes against women successfully. Two important
lessons can be drawn from previous tribunals. First, it is important to make
women feel both physically and psychologically safe.92 To help create a
safe environment at the EC, investigators and prosecutors must be trained to
ask questions in a way that empowers women to tell their story.
Specifically, investigators should be trained to ask appropriate questions
and to listen to the clues in a woman’s story that suggests evidence of
sexual violence. The second lesson speaks to the healing nature of a trial
for the victim, in that no trial should re-traumatize a woman who has
suffered from sexual violence. The bottom line is that women victims or
witnesses must be given a “genuine choice between remaining silent and
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coming forward.”93 In other words, tribunal officials should communicate
to women that they are the actors who hold the power to testify or not to
testify. All other protective measures for victims and witnesses should also
stem from this baseline.
Admittedly, capacity-building programs aimed at the Cambodian
judiciary have not had much success over the years because of corruption
within the Cambodian judiciary. The Cambodian political and economic
elite influence judicial outcomes in nearly every case, despite attempts to
train judges to apply international standards for fair trials. Judicial trainings
in Cambodia now carry the aura of futility; consequently, donors
increasingly refuse to fund them. But as Steve Heder points out, the
problem is not the judiciary’s incapacity to analyze the law critically and
exercise independent judgment; rather, “the problem is the determination of
key political players to prevent training and knowledge from being put to
use against their fundamental political and economic interests.”94 Thus, the
international community has a responsibility to monitor the political
influence exerted on judges and other actors within the EC. A problem as
entrenched as corruption will not be reversed overnight, but the
international spotlight on Cambodia’s legal system creates an unusual
window of opportunity to educate members of the legal system about
international standards of fairness.
D. Women as Officials of the Extraordinary Chambers
The experience of other tribunals has revealed, unsurprisingly, that when
women serve in high-level capacities on the tribunal, crimes against women
are more likely to be addressed. The ICTR’s Akayesu decision, which
contributed significantly to the development of rape jurisprudence under
international law, originally did not include rape in the indictment.
Akayesu was the former mayor of the Taba commune who was accused of
allowing those under his authority to rape mostly Tutsi women who had
sought his protection. International human rights groups derided the
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prosecutor’s omission of rape in the original indictment, but many attribute
the prosecutor’s late decision to amend the indictment to the presence of a
woman judge on the panel who pushed for the inclusion of those crimes.95
As this example illustrates, appointing women as judges, prosecutors, and
investigators will increase the likelihood that sexual violence will be
prosecuted before the EC.
By serving in these high-profile positions, women help break the silence
surrounding crimes against women. As Kelly Askin notes,
[T]heir presence in decision-making positions represents a
monumental advance over women’s traditionally minimized role
and status in international law bodies or organizations, including in
prior international war crimes tribunals. Consequently, the
jurisprudence of the United Nations Tribunals reflects women’s
participation.96
Including women as EC officials and training them on the international
legal standards for sexual violence will allow women to develop a
responsible jurisprudence for crimes of sexual violence in Cambodia and
take the lead in reforming this area of domestic law.

IV. RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN CAMBODIA
As the previous sections have addressed, crimes against women may not
figure prominently in the historical record created by the EC, or give
victims of sexual violence the chance to face their perpetrators and demand
justice. Just as crimes against women have been silenced since the Khmer
Rouge era, so have the women’s particular desires for reconciliation. No
formal research has been undertaken to ascertain women’s goals in the
reconciliation process, or on their views concerning which strategies will
best effectuate these goals.
In a recent survey distributed to readers of DC-Cam’s monthly magazine,
Searching for the Truth, respondents were asked a variety of questions to
solicit their feelings about the Khmer Rouge and national reconciliation.97
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A large number of respondents, 67 percent, claimed that they could not
forgive the Khmer Rouge commanders, and 54 percent said that they would
be unable to forgive the lower-level cadre.98 Most also linked their capacity
for forgiveness to accountability, with 57 percent stating that a tribunal
offers the best mechanism for forgiveness.99 But the survey contributes
little to an understanding of whether women tend to favor a tribunal over
other forms of reconciliation. Although the respondents were drawn from
diverse geographic regions and professions, they were “predominantly
male,”100 and gender did not factor into the analysis of their preferences.
The obvious precondition to introducing a reconciliation strategy that
addresses crimes against women is to conduct comprehensive research into
women’s experiences with the Khmer Rouge and their views on how best to
face the past.101
What the DC-Cam survey does suggest, however, is that even if the EC
succeeds in convicting a few senior leaders, the tribunal will not heal the
deep social ruptures in Cambodian society. With over half of Cambodians
claiming that they are unable to forgive the lower-level cadre, reconciliation
will remain elusive without a comprehensive transitional justice strategy102
that incorporates a restorative justice model. In contrast to the retributive
justice model of legal tribunals, restorative justice reorients the process with
a victim-centered approach that allows the victim to tell her story to an
unbiased decision-maker.103
The EC’s enduring focus on the retributive justice model has prevented
the Cambodian government from calling for restorative justice mechanisms.
There has been some discussion, however, within Cambodian civil society,
and among international observers, about designing a local justice
mechanism—that is, one that derives from Cambodia’s specific
sociocultural, historical, and legal culture—to promote reconciliation on the
community level. Local justice mechanisms have been used in other postconflict contexts instead of using the “top-down” approach of accountability
present in international tribunals, which rarely take into account the specific
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needs of local communities. The underlying premise of local justice
mechanisms is that reconciliation strategies designed from the “bottom up”
offers a more genuine process of social repair because local populations are
more invested in the process.
An appropriate local justice mechanism could help expose the truth about
sexual violence under the Khmer Rouge and lead to lasting reconciliation.
Taking the emphasis off of the individual perpetrator and placing it on the
victim and the community-at-large would help address the community-wide
problem of sexual violence that has endured since the Khmer Rouge era.
On the other hand, local justice mechanisms often have patriarchal roots
that could endanger any legitimate attempt at reconciliation between female
victims and their perpetrators. By drawing primarily on the example of
Rwanda’s gacaca process, this section will explore how Cambodians can
open channels of dialogue about sexual crimes under the Khmer Rouge
through a local justice initiative.
A. Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts and Other Local Justice Models
Perhaps the best-known example of local justice following a period of
mass atrocity is Rwanda’s process of post-genocide community
reconciliation called the Inkiko-Gacaca (literally, the Gacaca Jurisdictions).
These local courts are based on customary dispute resolution mechanisms
called gacaca and are named for the grass upon which community leaders
sit when hearing villagers’ complaints. These informal and ad hoc sessions
persisted throughout Rwanda’s period of colonization, dealing with issues
such as land rights, property damage, marital disputes, and inheritance
rights.104 The Gacaca Jurisdictions were created in 2001 by the Rwandan
government under the leadership of President Paul Kagame in order to
address two problems: the failure of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda and the national courts to further the goal of national reconciliation
or attain justice for most Rwandans, and the unsustainable burden of
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maintaining the 120,000 accused perpetrators of the genocide within
Rwanda’s fragile prison system.
Three laws provide the framework for Rwanda’s approach to
reconciliation. The 1996 Genocide Law gives the ICTR and the national
courts jurisdiction over “Category One”105 offenders, or the main leaders of
the genocide, notorious killers, and perpetrators of acts of sexual torture.
The 2001 Gacaca Law provided that the gacaca process would hold lowerlevel Hutu offenders accountable for their role in Rwanda’s genocide and
put on “trial” those offenders classified as Category Two (perpetrators or
accomplices to intentional homicides or serious assaults that led to death),
Category Three (other serious assaults), or Category Four (property crimes).
This law also expanded the scope of Category One crimes to explicitly
include rape, which is defined differently than “sexual torture” under
Rwandan criminal law.106 The reforms to the Gacaca Law passed in 2004
give jurisdiction to gacaca courts over pre-trial proceedings for all cases,
even for Category One crimes, that prosecutors did not transfer to regular
national courts prior to March 15, 2001.107 At the trial phase, gacaca courts
will retain jurisdiction over all perpetrators except those accused of
Category One crimes.
Gacaca, the only model of its kind in the world, is an experimental
process that sets out to achieve both reconciliation and justice at once. It
emphasizes reconciliation by giving perpetrators the opportunity to confess
their crimes, with the promise of reintegration into society after they do so.
Now in its initial investigative phase, gacaca calls together victims and
perpetrators to face each other in a public meeting. Defendants are given
the opportunity to confess publicly before those who survived the genocide,
while victims and community members may offer additional information.
Trials will take place in either the gacaca or the national courts.
Community judges are empowered to reduce sentences of a perpetrator
whom they deem has made a full and truthful account of his crimes. With
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over 750 gacaca courts now established, the Rwandan government hopes to
establish over 9,000 by 2006 when the trial phase is set to begin.108
Inkiko-Gacaca functions similarly to the traditional Rwandan gacaca
process, but the modern system has some important distinctions. Most
importantly, its focus is on extremely serious crimes rather than customary
disputes. Also, the new system is created and controlled by the state rather
than local authorities.109 Other important modernizations include the
popular election of community judges, called inyangamugayo, rather than
the appointment of community elders to the position, and mandatory, rather
than voluntary, participation by defendants in the process.110 And unlike
the traditional gacaca process that excluded women, the coordinating
committees of inyangamugayo include a balanced representation of women.
At least in the initial investigative phase, women appear to be
participating in the gacaca at a higher rate than men, attending more often
and asking more questions than male audience members.111
From a
gendered perspective, one of the key advantages to the gacaca process is
that it enables women victims to tell their stories in the way that they wish
to tell them.112 Many Rwandan women were humiliated when they testified
as victims before the ICTR, where defense counsel demanded that they
explain their experience of rape in explicit detail. Doing so forced the
women to commit a major cultural taboo and to risk being ostracized in
their communities. Samantha Power recalls that in one case, after the
defense counsel demanded that a victim explain on the stand what she
meant by “raping,” she recalled her reaction:
I didn’t know what to do. I looked around me for help. It is not
something you do in Rwandan culture. They asked me if it was for
a man to put his penis in a woman’s vagina. I nodded. They said I
had to repeat it. So I repeated it. But then I started to cry because
of the shame. For a Rwandan girl to use such words in her life,
you don’t know: it’s awful.113
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In contrast, the gacaca courts offer victims the chance to tell their own
stories in their own words, to confront their perpetrators, and to demand an
apology. The narrative event takes on a uniquely Rwandan—and highly
emotional—quality. Power describes the modern gacaca as a “public
confessional process that recalls both the Salem Witch Trials and a
Mississippi Christian revival.”114
Time will tell whether this public confessional process will spur social
repair generally and whether, in particular, it will provide an effective
opening to address gender-based crimes that occurred during the Rwandan
genocide. The proportional representation of women as judges and the high
rate of female citizen participation generated hopes that crimes of sexual
violence would be adequately addressed. The lack of formal evidentiary
rules also provides an opportunity to hold perpetrators accountable for rape
without the hurdle of presenting medicolegal evidence that was impossible
to collect in post-genocide Rwanda. Although some women have been retraumatized by testifying before the gacaca courts because of the highly
charged atmosphere Power describes, others have found it healing. One
woman reported:
There were about 2,000 people there. When I testified, people kept
quiet . . . . The judges said nothing. I said it all without shame.
Immediately after the war, I was ashamed and always started
crying. But since then, it is better. People encouraged me and the
women in the [support group for rape survivors] have helped me
too.115
Although more instances of rape and sexual violence have been reported
at gacaca than in national courts, these crimes have still been underreported
during the pre-trial phase of gacaca. A comprehensive study of gacaca by
Harvard University found three main reasons why women hesitated to
report rape before gacaca: fear of re-traumatization through telling the story,
guilt over attributing a Category One crime to the perpetrator and thereby
increasing his sentence to the death penalty, and shame or embarrassment at
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speaking publicly.116 Victims and witnesses also fear that their testimonies
will open them to acts of retribution by perpetrators or their families.117
Women are reluctant to testify because of gacaca’s insufficient
procedural protections. Originally, women were required to either testify
publicly before a full gacaca panel of nineteen judges or the general
assembly of 100 members. They could also write their testimony, but it
would then be read aloud. The 2004 reforms have improved the procedures
to provide for in camera hearings before one judge. These reforms came
after gacaca earned a reputation of insensitivity to women’s concerns, and
the reputation is difficult to repair. Additionally, closed-door hearings in
small communities, where people will automatically assume the victims
were raped, are “necessarily public” and ultimately inadequate to address
women’s feelings of shame, depression, and stigmatization.118 Further,
human rights groups have derided gacaca for the government’s failure to
train or adequately prepare the community judges and have called into
question the Rwandan government’s ability to ensure fair trials, given its
abysmal human rights record.119 Indeed, training of community judges has
been minimal, and even though women are decently represented, in most
cases these women are also village elders whose traditional value systems
do not prioritize women’s safety.120
The gacaca experiment, as well as local justice experiments in East
Timor, Sierra Leone, and elsewhere, can provide instructive lessons on
restorative justice for Cambodians. As discussed above, implementing
procedural safeguards, such as the ability for rape victims to give
confidential and private testimony, is critical to any community-based
process. Procedures must also be established to ensure independence and
neutrality among the community adjudicators. Rwanda has tried to correct
the influence of local leaders over the gacaca process by holding popular
elections for community judges. Gacaca has shown that although local
leaders promote community participation, their involvement can also reinstitutionalize social power relationships that disenfranchise female
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victims. A similar struggle exists in East Timor’s Commission for Truth,
Reception, and Reconciliation, a process that has attempted to reintegrate
militia members into local communities through reconciliation meetings.
Adapted from a traditional justice mechanism, the process allows militia
members to confess their crimes to village elders and promise not to repeat
them.121 One of its flaws is that communities rely on local leaders to
provide them information on perpetrators, which leads to criticism that
leaders too often protect their own interests.
The importance of practical considerations in this calculation cannot be
overestimated. East Timor’s Commission has run into problems when its
sentences conflict with the formal justice system’s trials against militia
leaders.122 Similarly, the failure to specify the relationship between Sierra
Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court for
Sierra Leone has generated both confusion and due process concerns.123 In
the Cambodian context, the relative jurisdictions of the EC and some local
mechanism must be distinguished at the outset. A second issue is funding.
Relying on community donations could open the door to corruption, but
outside funding would guarantee that victims and perpetrators are not
treated differently depending on their social and financial status within the
local community. However, international support is unlikely, given the
“donor fatigue” with the EC and a general skepticism of experimental local
justice mechanisms. A commitment on the part of Cambodia’s government
to sponsor such initiatives could offer the necessary independence and
neutrality to make the process fair. Similarly, a financial commitment on
behalf of the government would convey its interest in long-term
reconciliation and stability that could inspire funding from other sources.
No community-level reconciliation mechanism can be a completely
neutral and independent process, but by learning from these other systems,
Cambodians can anticipate and address these flaws from the outset. Like
Rwandans, Cambodians have repeatedly expressed the need to confront
their perpetrators publicly and to force them to explain their actions.
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Indeed, the impulse to confront and to demand answers—even more than
the need to know the facts, even more than a desire for revenge—is what
Cambodians mean when they say they want to know “why” the horrors
occurred.124 Thus, these experiments with local justice mechanisms may
inspire Cambodians to formulate their own grassroots approach to
reconciliation.
B. Local Justice in Cambodia
1. Buddhism
Some have suggested that a restorative justice mechanism for Cambodia
could draw on principles and teachings from the Middle Path of Buddhism,
which preserves social harmony through a spirit of compromise.125
Cambodia is an overwhelmingly Buddhist country and the monastery
represents the focal point of most communities. The Buddha taught that
forgiveness begins when the victim puts aside anger and instead acts out of
love, and when the perpetrator takes responsibility for his or her actions and
faces their consequences.126 As depicted in the film about her life, Tang
Kim turns to the teachings of the Buddha in order to deal with her anger.
One of the monks who helped guide her decision to become a nun quotes
from the Dharma: “‘Vindictiveness ends in vindictiveness.’ If someone
does something bad to you and you take revenge, the vindictiveness will
never end.”127 Buddhist legal thinking thus prioritizes two virtues—
understanding the consequences of one’s actions and promoting a positive
state of mind.128
In Cambodia, as in most of Southeast Asia, a rich legal tradition based on
principles of Theravada Buddhism was rapidly replaced by western legal
values in the nineteenth century.129 The monk as the traditional resolver of
disputes and the temple as the locus of reconciliation gave way under
French colonialism to a professional class of judges; dispute resolution
moved from the center of the community to the courthouse.130 These
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modern systems were characterized by popular distrust from their inception,
and the social disruption of the DK era soon after prevented effective
institution building.131 As a result, today the Cambodian legal system is
plagued by widespread corruption and is more widely distrusted by the
Cambodian people than ever. In contrast, the long historical role of the
monastery in community life allowed it to survive the enormous disruption
of the DK regime. For example, loyal villagers rebuilt pagodas soon after
the Khmer Rouge fell, and survivors housed the remains of relatives in
stupas across the countryside. Buddhist pagodas became important sites of
remembrance for those killed during the regime.132 Nevertheless, the DK
period caused a deep rupture in the practice and traditions of Buddhism
from which the institution has yet to truly recover.
Even though history suggests more hope for the monastery than the
courtroom to be the locus of reconciliation, Cambodians have not expressed
enthusiasm for the Buddhist reconciliation mechanisms proposed thus far.
While 74 percent of Cambodians favor a tribunal,133 only 15 percent of
Cambodians endorse a Buddhist ceremony in which perpetrators would
come forward to confess their crimes and ask for forgiveness.134 But it
would be a mistake to assume based on this statistic that Cambodians favor
no involvement of Buddhism in the reconciliation process. The concept of
apology, particularly public apology, is foreign to Cambodian society.
Furthermore, the survey proposed Buddhist reconciliation as a process in
itself, detached from the familiar role that Buddhism has always played in
community reconciliation techniques. Given the widespread corruption
within Buddhist institutions in Cambodia, the population’s distrust of these
institutions, and the historical gap in knowledge and tradition caused by the
Khmer Rouge regime, any reconciliation mechanism that incorporates
Buddhism must necessarily accommodate Cambodians’ ambivalence
towards it.
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2. Traditional Dispute Resolution: Somroh-somruel
Rural Cambodia has a traditional process of informal conflict resolution
called somroh-somruel.135 This process is a form of third-party mediation136
based on Buddhist principles of peacebuilding that takes place at the village
level, or phum.137 The most common types of disputes resolved through
this process are land and fishing lot disputes, neighborhood quarrels, and
domestic violence. When a dispute occurs, the parties may approach a
respected village chief, an elder, a commune chief, or a Buddhist monk to
mediate. The mediator often recruits village elders and lay religious
teachers to help in the resolution. Many community members are involved
in a long-term effort to compensate the victim, heal broken relationships,
and allow the parties to return to communal life. The conflict may be
resolved by referring to the Dharma or to codified, community-based krom
(norms), chbab (laws or rules), and vineay (modes of discipline). On the
community level, Buddhism is properly understood as an integral part of the
dispute resolution process, and it is inextricable from social relationships
and community organization.
The idea of a somroh-somruel process to address the crimes of the Khmer
Rouge has yet to be thoroughly explored. Would this be an appropriate
mechanism to address crimes of the DK era, particularly crimes of sexual
violence against women? Ultimately, communities seeking to address
sexual violence through traditional reconciliation methods will have to
balance the need to repair the social fabric through locally supported
mechanisms against the desire to reject traditions that oppress women. This
tension leads to controversial questions that cut into the core of social
traditions and community practices. What do you preserve? What do you
change?
This tension also warrants a careful weighing of the advantages and
disadvantages of local justice. Because it is familiar to most villagers,
somroh-somruel could foster participation of both victims and perpetrators
while involving the entire community. Similarly, it could carry a high level
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of legitimacy among local populations. However, there is no guarantee that
women’s grievances would be properly addressed in a somroh-somruel
process without significant adaptations. For example, even though somrohsomruel has been used in situations of domestic violence, the level of
women’s involvement in the actual mediation process is unclear. And
although Buddhist nuns, or duon chi, sometimes provide refuge to women
victims of domestic violence, they do not usually play key roles in the
resolution of the conflict itself.138
Somroh-somruel could provide a framework to draw women into the
overall reconciliation process and also to address crimes specific to their
experience. But an obvious requirement of a grassroots restorative justice
mechanism designed to address crimes against women is that it be driven
and controlled by women. As the traditional gacaca process in Rwanda was
modernized to give women greater control over the process, somrohsomruel could be similarly adapted so that nuns, female village elders, or
members of non-governmental organizations could figure more prominently
in the process. Rwanda’s gacaca process has shown that women serving in
positions of power as the inyangamugayo often uphold the patriarchal
values that oppress women; because of their detachment from village life,
Buddhist nuns may be able to avoid replicating these traditional power
structures. Buddhist nuns are perceived as less political than monks and
therefore less likely to be unduly influenced. As most nuns are older
women, a high percentage of nuns are also survivors of the Khmer Rouge
regime and command a high level of respect among villagers across
Cambodia. These are powerful reasons for urging nuns to serve as
mediators in a local process focusing on crimes against women.
As Rwanda has done in formalizing its traditional gacaca dispute
mechanism, Cambodians could incorporate modern procedural protections
into somroh-somruel to ensure that women are not re-victimized by the
reconciliation process itself. First, cases involving sexual violence could be
heard by a nun serving in the role of mediator, rather than a monk or male
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elder. Additionally, women could choose to conduct the hearing in private
in order to minimize the shame that would arise in telling their stories
publicly and the intimidation of confronting their perpetrators. Other postconflict situations have shown that for many women, telling the stories of
their rapes in public may be more painful than continuing to suppress their
memories of the acts. To be sure, this private approach would differ from
the confrontational aspect of most transitional justice mechanisms, which
seek a public disclosure of the truth as the path towards social
reconciliation. But it would also recognize the concept that the crime of
rape causes different kinds of harm than other crimes of war, and as such
demands a different approach. In short, a private hearing may calm the
natural dissonance between the private act of rape and the public event of
retelling it.
3. Creative Approaches
DC-Cam’s documentary film about Tang Kim’s life models a new
approach to reconciliation that holds promise for victims of sexual violence,
particularly in the context of patriarchal societies. The film presents a
condensed version of one individual’s reconciliation process. Exploring a
broad range of emotions, the victim wrestles with the conflict between
facing her past and burying it. At the beginning of the documentary, Tang
Kim desires that her persecutors suffer as much as she did; she expresses
her anger towards the Khmer Rouge soldiers by declaring, “Take them all to
be killed so that I can have some peace.”139 After a while, she begins to
believe that she could reconcile with her perpetrators if they confessed their
crimes publicly. The process of telling her story on camera transforms her
desire for revenge into an overriding desire for peace. In the end, she
decides to enter the monastery so that she will be sheltered from the
judgments and recriminations of villagers who now know her past. “I am
happy here [at the pagoda]. In the village, it was too noisy from the people
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fighting and quarreling. Here, we only hear the sounds of chanting . . . .
Everyone seeks the truth.”140
Expressing her narrative through the medium of a documentary, rather
than through a public confrontation with her perpetrators, grants Tang Kim
a certain freedom from cultural constraints. She is at times angry, confused,
and demanding, but noticeably uncensored. Tang Kim herself did not agree
to speak publicly about the film after it was made. “I think it is better if I
don’t reveal my story. That way, people will not know who I am, and I will
feel more at peace.”141 She clearly does not want to endure the pain of
retelling her story until she is assured that she can face her perpetrators and
demand answers; she explains, “If they admit their actions, it would be up
to me to forgive them or not.”142 The film preserves the story, thereby
accomplishing two goals at the same time. It retains its power to impact
new viewers with the force of her narrative at every screening while also
releasing Tang Kim from the burden of retelling it and reactivating the pain
of those events.
DC-Cam’s plan to screen “The Khmer Rouge Rice Fields” in
communities across Cambodia will illuminate the role of art and new media
in the process of reconciliation. This experiment breaks new ground in
several ways. First, the film can spark community discussions about a
buried piece of history and the taboo topic of sexual crimes. Second,
because the film does not endorse one answer to the question of how to find
accountability for perpetrators of rape, it can spur local populations to
address the barriers within their communities and debate potential solutions.
Third, the film can serve as a gateway for communities to address their
concerns and hopes about the broader issues of accountability and
reconciliation in Cambodia. Fourth, this film can validate victims’ stories
of rape even before they choose to tell them and thereby encourage other
women to share their experiences with sexual violence under the Khmer
Rouge. As Rachana Phat, the film’s director, explains: “Women must be
given a chance to share their stories of tremendous hardships to remind
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others that they are not alone in their sufferings.”143 It serves the goal of
individual reconciliation for Tang Kim and other women who struggle
against the weight of social constraints, repressed memories, and the fear of
conjuring a dark history. As a popular education tool, “The Khmer Rouge
Rice Fields” also spurs social reconciliation by teaching Cambodians about
the unique experiences of women in the DK era. In this way, the film itself
becomes a grassroots mechanism for reconciliation.
Finally, a discussion about rape in the past begs the question about rape
in Cambodia today. As discussed in Section II (D), survivors of rape in
Cambodia are re-victimized by the country’s hostile legal system.
Untrained legal professionals, unbridled corruption, and barriers to access
for the poor contribute to this hostile legal culture. The film cannot address
these problems, but it can challenge patriarchal views that blame women
victims for the crime of rape. These views abound in Cambodian culture
and influence the way that judges apply the law, even when the law itself
would protect women.

V. CONCLUSION
Cambodian views towards reconciliation have constantly evolved since
the Khmer Rouge regime fell. Most Cambodians now accept that
reconciliation cannot be possible without some form of accountability. The
latest step towards accountability and reconciliation with the creation of the
Extraordinary Chambers has already spurred a robust conversation about
what Cambodians want and need for reconciliation, both in the short and
long-term and at the individual and social level. For the first time since
1979, the international community has committed to help Cambodia face its
past. International legal experts, lawyers, and judges stand ready to lend
their expertise to the EC in hopes of finding accountability for Khmer
Rouge victims and building the historical record to address one of the most
murderous regimes in world history.
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Although the road to justice and reconciliation will be long for victims of
sexual violence under the Khmer Rouge, time and opportunity still exist to
remedy the omissions from the historical record and hold accountable the
perpetrators of rape and other gender-based crimes. Adopting rules of
procedure that protect victims and witnesses will send a strong message to
Cambodians that the process encourages their participation. Institutional
mechanisms, such as a unit within the EC to address the needs of special
victims, can help remedy the EC’s current flaws. True, these adjustments
will require additional resources, but the return on the long-term investment
will exceed the short-term costs. These changes will promote both greater
public participation in the EC trials and renew Cambodians’ long-term trust
in the legal system. And even if few prosecutions for rape are obtained at
the EC, the effort to train Cambodian investigators, prosecutors, and judges
to responsibly prosecute crimes of sexual violence promises a lasting
impact on the Cambodian legal system, such as improved accommodations
for the special needs of rape victims, better application of existing rape
laws, and legislative action to strengthen victims’ rights.
The good news is that the momentum has already begun, mainly through
creative approaches within civil society. DC-Cam’s documentary film, in
which a brave Cambodian publicly acknowledges for the first time that rape
occurred under the Khmer Rouge regime, is an example of this bold effort
to face the past and the legacy that lives on today. Cambodians also have
the advantage of learning from the experiences of women in other postconflict situations such as Rwanda, South Africa, East Timor and Sierra
Leone. These courageous women have drawn attention to the particular
ways that women suffer during war, have educated local populations about
the legacy of sexual violence, and are working towards lasting cultural and
legal reform within their own societies.
Cambodian women face a long road towards accountability in a
patriarchal culture that still regards rape as shameful, and in a legal culture
that lacks the tools to hold perpetrators of rape accountable. Indeed, part of
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Tang Kim’s burden was feeling isolated and alone as she struggled to come
to terms with her past in a society that did not yet have the tools to receive
her story. Deciphering what happened to women under the Khmer Rouge
not only promises accountability for women like Tang Kim, but also has the
potential to fundamentally change the culture of impunity for rape
perpetrators in Cambodia today. In this way, the EC is best viewed as the
beginning, rather than the end, of Cambodia’s reconciliation story. As
Steve Heder reminds us, “The notion of ‘closure’ is antithetical to the
pursuit of truth and understanding, and therefore, ultimately to justice and
prevention.”144 Whatever the outcome, the EC will undoubtedly illuminate
what more needs to be done in the long pursuit of justice and reconciliation
for Cambodia.
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